Inner-city Dublin, long viewed as a locus of crime, drug abuse and poverty (Punch 2005) , became the focus of large-scale apartment development for the new middleclasses. The derelict warehouses of Dublin's docklands area were transformed into the gleaming office blocks of the very successful International Financial Services Centre (Murphy 1998) . In tandem with the economic miracle, the combination of rising real incomes and a deregulated mortgage market unleashed a latent demand for property ownership (Kitchin et al. 2010) . As the property boom gathered momentum, small-scale property developers increasingly assumed the role of super-wealthy entrepreneurs. On the back of massive land price inflation, a banking system enthralled with property markets and a facilitative planning system, Irish property developers became members of the super-rich.
While Ireland and the Irish have long been associated with property development and construction, as manual workers and labourers, the rise of the Celtic Tiger property developer marked a significant change in the practices, positioning and discourses surrounding property development and developers. In common with those in other countries, Irish developers had in the past been viewed as rapacious and the harbingers of soulless architecture. However these new developers were characterised by a new scale of operations and ambition. Enmeshed in the rhetoric of success, property developers were increasingly portrayed as influential place makers, sophisticated participants in complex financial arrangements, and global operators.
Throughout the early part of the twenty-first century, property developers, politicians and bankers formed a powerful triad of interests at the heart of a thorough-going political-economic and socio-cultural transformation of the country.
In its turn, the unravelling of the global property boom and the legacy of the global financial crisis had a profound impact on Irish economy and society. In a dramatic turn of events the Irish banking sector tottered on the edge of collapse and the state intervened to guarantee all bank debts in September 2008 (Drudy and Collins 2011) . At the core of the banks' problems was a vast mountain of debt underpinned by poorly performing property deals and a property market in free-fall. To rescue the banks, the state established a government agency, the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), to buy €81 billion of property loans off the banks at heavily discounted prices and subsequently the state became the largest property company in the world.
The story of the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger property developers offers insights into the role of the super-rich in material and symbolic place making. Irish developers were not only involved in the physical construction of place(s); they were very public actors in the construction of discourses of Ireland as a place of opportunity, entrepreneurialism and success. In contrast to the relative anonymity of high-rolling financial traders, property developers were celebrated media stars. Indeed, as the property boom gathered pace, stories of past property successes arguably became an essential prerequisite for mobilising new rounds of property investment. Developers with the 'Midas touch' were feted by the general and business media (both local and international) and courted by politicians. In this chapter we provide an account of the rise and impact of super-rich property developers in the Celtic Tiger economy. Two case studies of the changing fortunes of developers are presented which, not coincidentally, mirror the fortunes of the Irish economy. In the case studies, we critically reflect on the role of the developers' conspicuous consumption and personal wealth in mobilising the huge bank loans on which their urban imagineering was founded.
<A>GEOGRAPHIES OF THE SUPER-RICH PROPERTY DEVELOPER
In reflecting on the need to examine the geographies of the super-rich, Beaverstock et al. (2004) and Hay and Muller (2012) both comment on the rise of a new wealthy class.
This class derives its wealth not from inheritance but from work. Beaverstock et al.
argue:
<quotation>More recent theorisations identify the existence of a global bourgeois class who are somewhat different in the source of their wealth: rather than having it passed on through inheritance, their wealth is primarily derived from working to their fortunes and investments, with the very richest having significant investments in real estate businesses, stock and financial securities, as well as the growing market in luxury collectibles (wine and art). (Beaverstock et al. 2004, p. 402 )</quotation> They go on to examine issues relating to '"new money' activities (in software, finance and publishing and media) as the growing source of wealth" (p. 402) and address issues relating to the 'extreme global mobility' (p. 404) of the super-rich. The focus on 'new money' activities discursively locates the super-rich in a fast world of hyper-mobile capital. While ultra-high net worth individuals clearly operate in the context of mobility, some of their sources of wealth are nonetheless embedded in specific locations (Beaverstock et al. 2011) , particularly the wealth generated from real estate.
Consequently, we argue in this chapter that a focus on wealthy property developers offers insights into the processes involved in the amassing of wealth but also insights into the ways in which the super-rich can affect the materiality of contemporary urban spaces and urban life, as well as the symbolic space of urban imagineering. These 'city builders' (Fainstein 2001) Berkeley Court Hotel site in Ballsbridge, a prestigious central suburb known for its expensive residential streets and as a centre of foreign embassies, for a then record €379 million (Kelly 2011) . The Jurys purchase price equated to then unprecedented €54 million per acre. Dunne's subsequent purchase of Hume House, an office block adjacent to the Jurys site for €130 million raised his investment in the site to over €500 million.
These purchases were funded with loans from Ulster Bank (a subsidiary of RBS) which syndicated the loan, bringing in other overseas banks including the Icelandic Kaupthing Bank. While the bulk of the funding for the Jurys site was secured from banks' loans, it was reported that Dunne contributed €130 million of his own money (Quinlan 2009 ). In the following year, he purchased the AIB Bankcentre site, again in Ballsbridge, for €207 million.
The high price paid for the Jurys site necessitated that the scale of any development be significant and Dunne certainly envisaged a grandiose project aligned to his professed desire to transform the area into 'a new Knightsbridge' with a 'Manhattan-like lifestyle'. His initial €1 billion masterplan included a 37 storey, glassclad residential tower (cut like a diamond), 14 000 square metres of retail space, a 232 bedroom hotel, an 18 000 square metre embassy complex and a 28 000 square metre office complex (Mountbrook 2007) . Notwithstanding the fact that the development breached the local planning regulations, and was out of character with the local residential environment, the Council initially approved the development minus the 37-storey tower. Thereafter, Dunne entered into a protracted and contentious set of planning appeals. In September 2011, a much scaled-back €300 million development, minus the embassy complex and with a 12-storey tower replacing the original 37 storeys, was eventually approved (Kelly 2011) . The willingness of bankers to underwrite grandiose development projects reflected not just the present value of projected income streams but also an evaluation of the extent to which developers had 'skin in the game' or money in the development. The wealth of developers was materially incorporated into property deals though the use of personal guarantees. Dunne's purchase of the Jurys site and his use of personal guarantees was symptomatic of this process. In theory, the large houses, helicopters, jets and expensive cars were developers' personal assets that offered the opportunity for banks to chase down any bad debts. These guarantees were a backstop against any deal that went sour.
They were not, however, designed to deal with a systemic property market collapse.
Significantly, since the crash NAMA has pursued developers such as Dunne and Carroll for payment of personal guarantees. For NAMA, and the courts, these guarantees from wealthy developers represent material assets that were central to the property deals that they were employed in, and need to be recovered ( The fall from grace of the developer-banker-politician triad that was responsible for the Celtic property boom was rapid and has had profound implications for Irish economy and society (see Kitchin et al. 2010) . The socialisation of the bankers and developers failed deals via NAMA, combined with the implementation of economic austerity measures to meet the demands of the ECB and the IMF, have impacted upon all elements of the Irish citizenry, but especially the poor.
Developers are no longer feted as dynamic entrepreneurs but are viewed as key authors of the crisis. Liam Carroll, who once had a net worth of almost €1 000 000 000, is now bankrupt. Sean Dunne, the 'squire' of Ballsbridge, admitted to The New York
Times that he was technically insolvent (Thomas 2009) , and is increasingly struggling to secure his future (McDonald and O'Donovan 2012) . Johnny Ronan's 'larger than life' roguish character traits that were once viewed as endearing are now viewed as inappropriate and damaging to the future development of the company. Notwithstanding the public opprobrium levelled at developers, they continue to maintain that with time and money they can weather the crash and, in a Faustian deal, NAMA is continuing to support larger developers as a way of generating a return on its, and the taxpayers', portfolio. The specific character of the Irish property boom, with its emphasis on personal guarantees, places the super-rich at the heart of property deals. As super-rich developers have scrambled to secure their assets, the Irish economy and people have paid a huge price for their extravagance. As property values have crashed, one in three household mortgages in the state are in negative equity and mortgage arrears rates are soaring (Kitchin 2012) , it is clear that Ireland's super-rich property developers have left a dubious legacy.
